Specification and Verification of Context-dependent Services by Ibrahim, Naseem et al.
L. Kovacs, R.Pugliese, and F. Tiezzi (Eds.): Workshop on
Automated Specification and Verification of Web Systems
(WWV 2011)
EPTCS 61, 2011, pp. 17–33, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.61.2
c© N. Ibrahim, V. Alagar, M. Mohammad
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works License.
Specification and Verification of Context-dependent Services
Naseem Ibrahim, Vangalur Alagar, and Mubarak Mohammad
Department of Computer Science & Software Engineering
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
{n ibrah,alagar,ms moham}@cse.concordia.ca
Current approaches for the discovery, specification, and provision of services ignore the relationship
between the service contract and the conditions in which the service can guarantee its contract. More-
over, they do not use formal methods for specifying services, contracts, and compositions. Without
a formal basis it is not possible to justify through formal verification the correctness conditions for
service compositions and the satisfaction of contractual obligations in service provisions. We remedy
this situation in this paper. We present a formal definition of services with context-dependent con-
tracts. We define a composition theory of services with context-dependent contracts taking into con-
sideration functional, nonfunctional, legal and contextual information. Finally, we present a formal
verification approach that transforms the formal specification of service composition into extended
timed automata that can be verified using the model checking tool UPPAAL.
1 Introduction
In [12] and [11], we introduced a formal framework, called FrSeC, that supports the specification, pub-
lication, discovery, selection, composition and verification of services with context-dependent contracts.
The work reported in this paper is founded on this framework. We provide a formal specification of
services with context-dependent contracts and their compositions. The composition theory of services
takes into consideration the functional, nonfunctional, legal, and contextual aspects of services. We also
present a formal verification approach that transforms the formal specification of service composition
into UPPAAL [2] timed automata in order to verify service properties using model checking.
Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) is an emerging view of the future of distributed computing and
enterprise application development [4]. However, current approaches for the specification, publication,
discovery, selection, and provision of services fall short in important respects. First, the relationship
between the service contract and the conditions in which the service can guarantee its contract has been
ignored, however these are necessary in order to associate the context of the service provider and the
context of the service requester. Second, contextual information [3] is not well represented and not
rigorously applied in service discovery and service provision. Third, current composition approaches
compose only service functionality and ignore nonfunctional requirements. Thus, service contracts, and
context information that are part of services are left out of the composition, and verification. Fourth and
the last, the published approaches do not use formal methods for the specification of services, contracts,
contextual representation and application, and service composition. Without a formal basis it is not
possible to justify through formal verification the correctness conditions for service compositions and the
satisfaction of contractual obligations in service provisions. The work reported in this paper eliminates
these shortcomings.
The basic building unit for SOA-based applications is service. It is normally understood that ser-
vice is an autonomous and platform-independent software program, having its own distinct functionality
and a set of capabilities related to this functionality. These capabilities are usually invoked by exter-
nal consumer programs and are usually expressed via a published service contract. A service contract
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Figure 1: ConfiguredService
establishes the terms of engagement with the service, provides technical constraints and requirements,
and provides any semantic information the service owner wishes to make public [4]. We reckon that a
Service Provider will package service functionality with non-functional attributes, service contract, and
context. So, we decided to deal with ConfiguredServices, which are formalized in Section 2. A Service
Provider may choose to compose ConfiguredServices. The composition mechanism itself may be driven
by the business model of the Service Provider. Keeping this point of view, we discuss in Section 3 a
formal composition theory of services (ConfiguredServices). Section 4 presents an approach to formally
verify service properties in service compositions. In Section 5, we briefly, yet critically, compare our
work with related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of ongoing work.
2 ConfiguredService Definition
Services are defined by service providers in a contract first approach. That is, the contract is defined
before the implementation of service [4]. The service provider determines all the possible contracts that
this service should satisfy. Then, the service provider defines the ConfiguredServices that represents
those contracts. After that, the service provider develops the ImplementedService that implements the
different ConfiguredServices that provide the same functionality with different contracts and contexts. A
ConfiguredService is to be published in Service Registry and made available for discovery and selection.
A ConfiguredService is a package in which service functionality, service contract, and service provision
context are bundled together. The Service Provider publishes the ConfiguredService elements. The pub-
lished elements should be sufficient for the discovery and selection of this service. The essential elements
that make this happen are contract and context, as shown in Figure 1. The contract will include function,
nonfunctional properties and legal issues. Trustworthiness features are included in the nonfunctional
part of the contract and legal issues include business rules and other trade laws within the context.
• Function: A ConfiguredService provides a single function. The function definition will include
the function signature, result, preconditions and postconditions. The signature part defines the
function identifier, the invocation address, and the parameters of the function. Each parameter
has an identifier and a type. The result part defines the returned data of the service function.
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The preconditions define the conditions that should be true before the function invocation. The
postconditions define the conditions that are guaranteed to be true after the function invocation.
• Nonfunctional properties: A ConfiguredService definition includes nonfunctional properties that
it can guarantee. These properties are to be chosen carefully so that they are verifiable, and en-
compass both quality and quantity aspects of service. Trustworthiness and Price are examples.
Trust itself is further divided into ConfiguredService trust and provider trust. These are explained
in detail in the next section. ConfiguredService trust defines the trustworthiness properties that
are related to service provision. It includes the features safety, security, availability, and reliabil-
ity [15]. Safety defines the critical conditions that are guaranteed to be true by Service Providers,
such as timing conditions. Security is a composite of data integrity and confidentiality. Availability
can be defined as the extent of readiness for providing correct services. Availability is specified
as the maximum accepted time of repair until the service returns back to operate correctly. Relia-
bility is the quality of continuing to provide correct services despite a failure. It is defined as the
accepted mean time between failures. Provider trust defines the trustworthiness properties that are
related to the Service Provider. It may include recommendations from other clients, and lowest
prices guarantees. There is no agreed upon definition for Provider trust. The main issue here is the
inclusion of verifiable information that makes a seller trusted.
• Legal Issues: One of the essential elements of the ConfiguredService contract is the set of legal
rules that constrain the contract. Business rules, such as refund conditions, interest and adminis-
trative charges, and payment rules, form one part of legal issues. Another part is the set of trade
laws enforced in the context of service request and delivery. Examples of the later kind are service
requesters rights, privacy laws, and censor rules. In the literature [16], no distinction was made
between legal rules and nonfunctional requirements. We reckon that a clear distinction should
be made between legal rules and nonfunctional properties. In many situations, if a nonfunctional
property is ‘a soft’ requirement it may be ignored, however ignoring a legal rule is equivalent to
‘legal violation’, which might land in legal disputes and even lead to loss of entire business. In
essence, not enforcing a legal rule prevents the execution of a contract.
The context part of the ConfiguredService will include the main parts ConfiguredService context and
context rules. The ConfiguredService context defines the contextual information of the ConfiguredSer-
vice. Context is formally defined in [19] using dimensions and tags along the dimensions. We illustrate
context specification using the three dimensions WHERE, WHEN and WHO. The dimension WHERE is
associated with a location, which may be one or more of {Point, Region, Address, Route, URI, IP}. The
dimension WHEN is associated with temporal information, such as time and date. The dimension WHO
is associated with subject identities, such as the names of Service Providers and Service Requesters.
We can also use WHO dimension to associate information from job roles. The context rules define the
contextual information related to the Service Requester that should be true for the Service Provider to
guarantee the contract associated with the ConfiguredService. Rules are defined as constraints in a subset
of Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL), the logic used in UPPAAL. In practice, constraints can be
expressed as simple logical expressions within the first order predicate logic (FOPL), a subset of TCTL.
Example 1 This example introduces a simplified case study [1], restricted to emergency road assistance
service scenarios for automobiles. A typical scenario is the breakdown of a car on a highway, which
requests for road-side assistance. The car sends information to the nearest road assistance center, which
in turn will use the information received to identify the repair shop, tow truck and car rental companies
in that zone. In this example we identify three ConfiguredServices, whose detailed definitions are shown
in Figure 2.
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Address: XXX
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Pre:RequestTruck==T
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ConfiguredService
InputParameters:
CarBroken:bool
deposit:double
CarType:string
failureType:string
ResultName: ResultRS
OutputParameters:
HasAppointment:bool
numberOfHours:int
InputParameters:
RequestTruck:bool
CarType:string
ResultName: ResultTT
OutputParameters:
RequestConfi:bool
InputParameters:
NeedCar:bool
CarSize:string
StartDate:date
EndDate:date
ResultName: ResultCR
OutputParameters:
HasCar:bool
ConfNum:string
Figure 2: Roadside Emergency Services: ConfiguredServices Description
2.1 Formal Notation
We use a model-based approach to formally specify ConfiguredServices. The models are built from set
theory and logic. The model is built incrementally, according to the template in Figure 1.
Definition of Constraints: A constraint is a logical expression, defined over data parameters and at-
tributes. Any well-formed formula built by using standard logical operators, quantifiers, and temporal
operators allowed in TCTL [2] is a valid constraint. If C denotes the set of all such logical expressions,
X ∈ C is a constraint. The following notation is used in our definition:
• T denotes the set of all data types, including abstract data types.
• Dt ∈ T means Dt is a datatype.
• v : Dt denotes that v is either constant or variable of type Dt.
• Xv is a constraint on v. If v is a constant then Xv is true.
• Vq denotes the set of values of data type q.
• x :: ∆ denotes a logical expression x ∈ C defined over the set of parameters ∆.
Definition of Parameters: A parameter is a 3-tuple, defining a data type, a variable of that type, and
a constraint on the values assumed by the variable. We denote the set of data parameters as Λ = {λ =
(Dt,v,Xv)|Dt ∈ T,v : Dt,Xv ∈ C}.
Definition of Attributes: An attribute has a name and type, and is used to define some semantic informa-
tion associated with the name. As an example, each ConfiguredService can be given a version number,
which is defined as an attribute. The set of attributes is α = {(Dt,vα)|Dt ∈ T,vα : Dt}.
Definition of Context: A context is formalized as a 2-tuple β = 〈r,c〉, where r ∈ C, built over the
contextual information c. Context information is formalized using the notation in [19]: Let τ : DIM
→ I, where DIM = {X1, X2,...,Xn} is a finite set of dimensions and I = {a1,a2, ...,an} is a set of types.
The function τ associates a dimension to a type. Let τ(Xi) = ai, ai ∈ I. We write c as an aggregation of
ordered pairs (X j, v j), where X j ∈ DIM, and v j ∈ τ(X j).
Definition of Contract: A contract is a 3-tuple σ = 〈 f ,κ, l〉, where the service function f , the set of
nonfunctional properties κ and the set l of legal issues that bind the service contract are defined below.
• Service Function: A service function is a 4-tuple f = 〈g, i, pr, po〉, where g is the function signa-
ture, i is the function result, pr is the precondition, and po is the postcondition. A signature is a
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3-tuple g = 〈n,d,u〉, where n = (x|x : string) is the function identification name, d = {x|x ∈ Λ} is
the set of function parameters and u = (x|x : string) is the function address, the physical address
on a network that can be used to call a function. For example, it can be an IP address. The result is
defined as i = 〈m,q〉, where m = (x|x : string) is the result identification name and q = {x|x ∈ Λ}
is the set of parameters resulting from executing the ConfiguredService. The precondition pr and
postcondition po are data constraints. That is, pr = {y|y :: z,z⊆ Λ} and po = {y|y :: z,z⊆ Λ}.
• Nonfunctional Property: A nonfunctional property of a ConfiguredService is a composite property,
written as a 6-tuple κ = 〈ρ,ε,ψ,η , p, tr〉, where ρ is the safety guarantee, ε is the security guar-
antee, η is the availability guarantee, ψ is the reliability guarantee, p is the service cost and tr is a
measure of the provider trust. The safety guarantee includes time guarantee ρt and data guarantee
ρd . We assume that time is a generic type. The time guarantee is defined as ρt = (x|x : time),
the time the service takes to provide its function. The data guarantee refers to the accuracy of
data, and is defined as ρd = {x|x :: z,z ⊆ Λ}. Let H denote the set of security protocols that the
Service Provider has followed to guarantee confidentiality and integrity constraints. Then the set
ε = {x|x ∈H} defines the extent of security binding the service. The reliability guarantee refers to
the guaranteed maximum time between failures, and is defined as ψ = (x|x : time). The availability
guarantee refers to the guaranteed maximum time for repairs, and is defined as η = (x|x : time).
The price is defined as a 3-tuple p = 〈a,cu,un〉, where a = (x|x :N) is the price amount defined as a
natural number, cu=(y|y : cType) is currency tied to a currency type cType, and un=(z|z : uType)
is the unit for which pricing is valid. As an example, p = (100,$,hour) denotes the pricing of
100$/hour. Provider Trust is defined as a 3-tuple tr = 〈ce, pg,re〉, where ce is recommendations
from other clients, pg is lowest prices guarantees and re is recommendations from independent or-
ganizations. Lowest price guarantee is represented by a flag pg = (a|a : Boolean). It is a Boolean
that is true when a ConfiguredService can guarantee its price to be lower than the price of any
other ConfiguredService providing the same functionality. Client recommendations and recom-
mendations from independent organizations can be defined as sets of ordered pairs. In ce =
{(a,b)|a : CLIENT,b ∈ {Low,BelowAverage,Average,AboveAverage,High}}, a pair (a,b) rep-
resents a client a whose recommendation is b. Likewise, in re = {(a,b)|a : ORGANIZAT ION,b ∈
{Low,BelowAverage,Average,AboveAverage,High}}, a pair (a,b) represents an organization a
whose recommendation is b.
• Legal Issues: A legal issue is a rule, expressed as a logical expression in C. A rule may imply
another, however no two rules can conflict. We write l = {y|y ∈ C} to represent the set of legal
rules.
Putting these definitions together we arrive at a formal definition for ConfiguredService.
Definition 1 A ConfiguredService is a 4-tuple s = 〈Λ,α,β ,σ〉, where Λ is a set of parameters, α is a
set of attributes, β is a context, and σ is a contract.
We remark that not all components of κ may be relevant for a service, as shown in many later examples.
In general, the trust domain, in which ce and pg are defined, must be a complete lattice [20]. This
property is essential in order to compare trust values of groups and compute minimum (maximum) among
trust values. For the sake of simplicity, we assume in further discussion that trust values assumed by ce
and re are whole numbers in the range 1 . . .5, where 1 denotes Low and 5 denotes High. This assumption
will enable us to calculate simple averages, maximum, and minimum of a set of trust values. Example 2
illustrates the application of the above formal notation to the ConfiguredService defined in Example 1.
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Example 2 Let rs denote the ConfiguredService for providing a Repair Shop who provides the services
described in Figure 2. The formal notation of ConfiguredService rs is srs = 〈Λrs,αrs,βrs,σrs,〉, where
the tuple components are explained below.
• parameters: Λrs = {(CarBroken,bool),(deposit,double),(CarType,string),( f ailureType,string),
(HasAppointment,bool),(numberO f Hours, int)}.
• attributes: αrs =Φ.
• context: βrs = 〈rrs,crs〉, where rrs = {(membership == caa)} is the context rule and crs =
{(Location,(Montreal,Canada))} is the contextual information of the emergency road service
provider
• contract: σrs = 〈 frs,κrs, lrs〉, where the elements of the 3-tuple are defined below:
1. contract functionality specification: frs = 〈grs, irs, prrs, pors〉
1.1 function signature: grs = 〈nrs,drs,urs〉, where
nrs = (ReserveRS) is the name, drs = {(CarBroken,bool), (deposit, double),
(CarType,string),( f ailureType,string)} are input data parameters, and urs =(XXX)
is the address
1.2 function result: irs = 〈mrs,qrs〉 , where
mrs = (ResultRS) is the name and the set of output data parameters is
qrs = {(HasAppointment,bool),(number O f Hours, int)}
1.3 function precondition: prrs = {(CarBroken == true)}
1.4 function postcondition pors = {(HasAppointm ent == true)}
2. contract nonfunctional property specification: κrs = 〈prs〉, prs = 〈ars,curs,unrs〉, where
ars = (60) is the cost, curs = (dollar) is the currency, and unrs = (hour) is the pricing unit
3. contract legal issue specification: lrs = {(deposit = 300),(CarType == toyota)}, where
the deposit amount is 300 and the car type is toyota.
3 Service Composition
Although service composition has been considered before by some researchers [4, 18] no specific method
has been put forth. In FrSec a service composition may be attempted either at design-time or at execution-
time. The former, called static composition, is driven by Service Provider’s business goals. The later,
called dynamic service composition, is driven by user’s demands at service provision contexts. In this
paper, we focus only on static service composition. We present a few composition constructs, give their
semantics and suggest a verifiable composition theory.
3.1 Composition Constructs
Defining a composite service includes defining the execution logic of the participant services. This
section, inspired by [21], defines the composition constructs and informally motivates their execution
logics.
• Sequential composition construct : Given two ConfiguredServices A and B, the expression
A B (Figure 3(a)) defines the sequential composition of A and B. The execution logic of this
composite service is that ConfiguredService A is executed first, and its output may be used in the
execution of ConfiguredService B, in addition to any input that B may require. In general, the
expression A1  A2 . . . Ak denotes the execution of ConfiguredService Ai+1 with the result of
execution of Ai as an input, for i = 1, . . . ,k−1, in addition to other input that Ai+1 might need.
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Figure 3: a) Sequential, b) Parallel, c) Priority d) No order, e) Nondeterministic, f) Conditional, and g)
Iteration Constructs
• Parallel composition construct ||: Given two ConfiguredServices A and B, the expression A||B
(Figure 3(b)) defines the parallel composition of A and B. The parallel composition A||B models
the simultaneous executions of ConfiguredServices A and B. In general, the evaluation of the ex-
pression A1 ‖ A2 ‖ . . . ‖ Ak will create k service execution threads, one for each ConfiguredService.
The result of this composite service is the merging of their individual results in time order. That
is, the execution of the composite service finishes only when all service executions terminate.
• Priority construct ≺: Given two ConfiguredServices A and B, the expression A≺ B (Figure 3(c))
defines that the service execution of A should be attempted first, and if it succeeds, the service
B is to be discarded; otherwise, the execution of service B should be attempted. In general, the
expression requires that the service executions be attempted deterministically in the order specified
until the first successful execution of service. The meaning of the expression A1 ≺ . . .≺ Ak is that
the service that can be successfully executed is the result of the composition.
• Composition with no order 3: Given two ConfiguredServices A and B, the expression A3B
(Figure 3(d)) defines that services A and B should be executed by the receiver, however the order
of their executions is not important. The result of the composition is the set of results produced
by the executions of the ConfiguredServices A and B. In general, the expression A13A23 . . .3Ak
defines the composition of services Ai, i = 1,k when all of them may be executed in no specific
order.
• Nondeterministic choice construct o: Given two ConfiguredServices A and B, the expression A oB
(Figure 3(e)) defines the composition in which one of the services is executed nondeterministically.
In general, A1 o . . . oAk denotes the execution of a nondeterministically chosen service from the k
operands. If the service Ai is the nondeterministic choice, the result from the evaluation of the
service Ai is the result of evaluating the composition A1 o . . . oAk. In using this composition it is
understood that any service Ai can be chosen for the intended purpose.
• Conditional choice construct (if-else) .: Given two service expressions E1 and E2, the composi-
tion expression E1 .c E2 (Figure 3(f)) states that if condition c evaluates to true then expression E1
is to be chosen for execution, otherwise expression E2 should be executed.
• Iteration construct (while) ◦: The composition E◦c (Figure 3(g)) states that the service expression
E should be executed as long as c evaluates to true.
Construct Binding All constructs have the same precedence, and hence a composite service expression
is evaluated from left to right. To enforce a particular order of evaluations, parenthesis may be used.
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Example 3 The execution logic of the composite service (A.c1 B) (C||D) F◦c2 , shown in Figure 4,
is obtained by putting together the execution logics from Figure 3.
A
B
c1
Tr
ue
Fa
ls
e
D
C
Fc2
True
Fa
ls
e
Figure 4: Execution logic of (A.c1 B) (C||D) F◦c2
3.2 Semantics of ConfiguredService Compositions
Every Service Provider has a business model. Motivated by the business rules and logic in the model, a
Service Provider will determine the nature of composition for services. We want to emphasize that the
meaning of a composition primarily rests on the chosen business goals and rules. Consequently, service
compositions are very much unlike action compositions based purely on preconditions and postcondi-
tions. As an example, a Service Provider may form A B because service B can be provided only after
service A has been provided. That is, service B cannot be realized without first executing service A. This
is analogous to ‘bootstrapping’ before invoking any other system function in the domain of computing
services. This implies that the precondition for invoking a system function includes the precondition for
invoking ‘bootstrapping’, however it might require more conditions to be met. Moreover, the postcondi-
tion of ‘bootstrapping’ and the postcondition of the system function invoked after that are both observed.
In some domains, it might happen that the precondition for invoking service B is exactly the same as
the postcondition of the first service A, and is not observable. Only the postcondition of B, after B is
completed, may be observable. Given such subtle scenarios, it is hard to give one ‘fixed’ semantics for
service compositions. Below we give the semantics for sequential composition. An account of the full
semantics can be found in [10]. The proposed semantics is appropriate for one kind of business logic, and
our approach can be used to provide semantics for different business logics. By providing an approach
to formal semantics for composition constructs we are motivating how a theory of composition can be
developed.
Below we let A = 〈ΛA,αA,βA,σA〉, and B = 〈ΛB,αB,βB,σB〉 denote two ConfiguredServices, where
βA = 〈rA,cA〉, βB = 〈rB,cB〉, σA = 〈 fA,κA, lA〉, σB = 〈 fB,κB, lB〉, fA = 〈gA, iA, prA, poA〉, fB = 〈gB, iB, prB,
poB〉, gA = 〈nA,dA,uA〉, gB = 〈nB,dB,uB〉, iA = 〈mA,qA〉, iB = 〈mB,qB〉, κA = 〈ρA,εA,ψA,ηA, pA, trA〉,
and κB = 〈ρB,εB,ψB,ηB, pB, trB〉. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the currency type cType and
the unit type uType are the same for all services.
3.2.1 Sequential composition A B
The sequential composition of the ConfiguredServices A and B is the tuple 〈ΛAB,αAB,βAB,σAB〉,
whose components are defined below.
• Parameters: ΛAB
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– Input parameters: Λinput(AB) = Λinput(A)∪ (Λinput(B) \Λout put(A)), defined as the union of the
input parameters of A, and input parameters of B that are not output parameters of A.
– Output parameters: Λout put(AB) = Λout put(A)∪Λout put(B), defined as the union of the output
parameters of A and B.
• Attributes: αAB = αA∪αB
• Context: For ConfiguredServices A the context is βA = 〈rA,cA〉. This means that rA is true in
context cA in order that A may be provided. Once the service A has been provided, the context and
rules that are true in that context should be computed. Letting these rules r′A and the context c
′
A, we
need to merge them with rB and cB, βB = 〈rB,cB〉 to arrive at βAB. With this rationale, we define
βAB = 〈rAB,cAB〉, rAB = r′A∪rB, and cAB = c′AunionsqcB, the smallest closure of contexts c′A and
cB. It is expected that c′A @ cB holds for most of the applications, because anything outside of cB
can be ignored. The semantics of context union (unionsq) and sub-context (@) and a detailed discussion
of context calculus can be found in [19].
• Contract: σAB = 〈 fAB,κAB, lAB〉, where
1. function: fAB = 〈gAB, iAB, prAB, poAB〉, gAB = 〈nAB,dAB,uAB〉, iAB = 〈mAB,
qAB〉, where
gAB :
nAB = nA _ nB naming convention
dAB = dA∪dB combine input data parameters
uAB = {uA,uB} both function addresses are necessary
iAB :
mAB = mA _ mB naming convention
qAB = qA∪qB combine output parameters
prAB = prA∪ (prB \ poA) if B requires more constraints
prAB = prA if B does not require more constraints
poAB = poA∪ poB if poA is observable
poAB = poB if poA is not observable
2. Nonfunctional Properties: κAB = 〈ρAB,εAB,ψAB,ηAB, pAB, trAB〉 where,
– Safety (timeliness): ρAB = ρA +ρB.
– Safety (data): ρAB = ρA∪ρB.
– Security: εAB = εA∪ εB.
– Availability: ηAB = ηA +ηB.
– Reliability: ψAB = Min(ψA,ψB).
– Price: pAB = 〈aAB,cuAB,unAB〉 where cuAB = cuA = cuB, unAB = unA = unB,
and
aAB =

aA +aB normal pricing
max{aA,aB} promotional
min{aA,aB} special sale
– Provider Trust: Let trAB = 〈ceAB, pgAB,reAB〉. Given a set st of trust values, it
should be possible to define avg(st), choose(st), glb(st), and lub(st) which respectively
computes the average, selects randomly one value, and computes the least and greatest
values from the set st . Any one of these functions may be used by the Service Provider in
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providing ce and re. Each choice has some significance. Choosing avg reflects ‘unbiased
views of customers’, choosing choose reflects a randomly selected customer opinion,
choosing glb reflects a conservative estimate, and choosing lub reflects the optimistic
opinion of customers. For illustration, we use the function glb. We compute the trust
sets as
ceA\B = {(a,b) | (a,b) ∈ ceA,(a,b) /∈ ceB} recommendation
given for A only
ceB\A = {(a,b) | (a,b) /∈ ceA,(a,b) ∈ ceB} recommendation
given for B only
ceA∩B = {(a,b) | (a,b1) ∈ ceA,(a,b2) ∈ ceB,b = glb(b1,b2)} recommendation
given for A and B
Similar sets for re are defined. The trust for the composition A B can be defined for
different semantics.
∗ Business Logic: Service A is required for service B. In this situation the expectation
is that those who bought service B should have obtained service A, and hence they
bought the service A B. That is, the recommendation for B dominates. With this
semantics we define
ceAB = ceA∩B∪ ceB\A
reAB = reA∩B∪ reB\A
∗ Business Logic: Those who bought service A are most likely to buy service B. In
this situation buying A is a certainty. Not everyone who bought A may buy B. That
is, service recommendation for A dominates. With this semantics we define
ceAB = ceA∩B∪ ceA\B
reAB = reA∩B∪ reA\B
∗ Business Logic: Both services are packaged together: With this semantics the Ser-
vice Provider has to collect the sets ce and re from clients and organizations for the
new service.
In all above situations
pgAB = pgA∧ pgB
3. Legal Issues: lAB = lA∪ lB, defined as the union of the issues of A and B.
Example 4 The sequential composition rule is applied to compute rs tt, where the ConfiguredSer-
vices rs (repair shop) and tt (tow truck) are defined in Example 1. The formal notation of composite
ConfiguredService is srstt = 〈Λrstt ,αrstt ,βrstt ,σrstt〉, where the tuple components are
• The CofiguredService parameters set isΛrstt = {(CarBroken,bool),(deposit,double),(CarType,
string),( f ailureType,string),(RequestTruck,bool),(HasAppointment,bool),(numberO f Hours,
int),(RequestCon f i,bool)}.
• The ConfiguredService attribute set is αrstt =Φ.
• The ConfiguredService context is βrstt = 〈rrstt ,crstt〉, where the context rules are rrstt =
{(membership== caa)} and the context information is crstt = {(Location,(Montreal,Canada))}.
• The ConfiguredService contract is σrstt = 〈 frstt ,κrstt , lrstt〉
• The contract function is frstt = 〈grstt , irstt , prrstt , porstt〉
• The function signature is grstt = 〈nrstt ,drstt ,urstt〉, where the name is nrstt =(ReserveRS&T T ),
the address is urstt =(XXXYYY ) and the input parameters are drstt = {(CarBroken,bool),(deposit,
double),(CarType,string),( f ailureType,string),(RequestTruck,bool)}.
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• The function result is irstt = 〈mrstt ,qrstt〉 , where the result name is mrstt = (ResultRS&T T )
and the output parameters are qrstt = {(HasAppointment, bool),(numberO f Hours, int),(Request
Con f i,bool)}.
• The precondition is prrstt = {(CarBroken == true),(RequestTruck == true)} and the postcon-
dition is porstt = {(HasAppointment == true),(RequestCon f i == true)}.
• The contract legal issues are lrstt = {(deposit = 300),(CarType == toyota)}.
• The contract nonfunctional properties are κrstt = 〈prstt〉, where the price is prstt = 〈arstt ,
curstt ,unrstt〉, the price amount is arstt = ((60∗numberO f Hours)+100), the price currency
is curstt = (dollar) and the price unit is unrstt = (oneTime).
4 Formal Verification
A service composition consists of multiple interacting ConfiguredServices that provide a functionality
to meet a specific set of requirements. It is essential to verify that the functional behavior of the ser-
vice composition meets the requirements of the service requesters while taking into consideration the
nonfunctional, legal and contextual conditions. Instead of defining a new verification tool to verify the
service composition we follow a transformation approach. In this approach, a formally defined service
composition can be automatically transformed into a model understood by an available verification tool
that can then be used to perform the formal verification. The goal in our research is to use different
verification tools in order to verify a wide range of properties and target different kinds of systems. This
is because different verification tools differ in their requirements and abilities. In this paper, we define
the transformation rules to generate a model that can be verified using UPPAAL [2] model checking tool.
A full account of UPPAAL language and tool can be found in [2]. In essence, UPPAAL extends
the definition of timed automata (TA) with additional features. The features that are relevant to this
paper are (1) Templates that represent TAs with optional parameters and local variables; (2) Global
variables and user defined functions, that are introduced in a global declaration section, and shared by
all templates; (3) Binary synchronization that forces two TAs to have a synchronized transition caused
by an event; (4) Channel that models an input event (labeled with ?) or an output event (labeled with !)
in a synchronous transition; (5) Committed Location that models a state where time is not allowed to
pass, and allowed to have an outgoing edge; (6) Expressions that include Guard expressions involving
variables and clock variables to restrict transitions, Assignment expressions, which are used to set values
of clocks and variables, and Invariant expressions, which are defined at locations to specify conditions
that should be always true; and (7) Edges denoting transitions between locations. An edge specification
consists of the four expressions 1) Select, which assigns a value from a given range to a defined variable,
2) Guard, an edge is enabled for a location if and only if the guard is evaluated to true, 3) Synchronization,
which specifies the synchronization channel and its direction for an edge, and 4) Update, an assignment
statement that resets variables and clocks to required values. UPPAAL can check safety, reachability,
and liveness properties that are expressed in TCTL [8].
4.1 Transforming the Service Composition into UPPAAL TA
This section presents the rules for transforming a service composition into a UPPAAL TA. Let S =
{s1, ...,sn} be the set of ConfiguredServices to be composed. Let ϒ be the execution flow defining the
composition, and SC = 〈S,ϒ,Λ,α,β ,σ〉 be the resulting composition. Let TA = 〈L,L0,K,A,E, I〉 be the
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definition of a UPPAAL TA, where L is a set of locations denoting the states, L0 is the initial state, K is
a set of clocks, A is a set of actions that cause transitions between locations, E is a set of edges, and I is a
set of invariants. The transformation rules will construct T = {ta1, ..., tan}, a set of UPPAAL templates.
The first step is to define the following in the global declaration section in UPPAAL.
1. Two channel variables are defined for each si. The first represents the request and the second
represents the response.
2. A Boolean variable is defined for every precondition and input parameter in SC and assigned
to true. These variables are used to verify if preconditions and input parameters exist before
execution.
3. A Boolean variable is defined for every postcondition and output parameter in SC and assigned
to false. These variables are used to verify if postconditions and output parameters exist after
execution.
4. A typed variable is defined for every parameter in SC. The type can be any simple type, such as
int, or a structured data type.
5. The following variables of type double are defined and assigned to 0 for each composition flow:
• PathPrice, which represents the total price of the composition flow.
• PathAvailability, which represents the availability of the composition flow.
• PathReliability, which represents the reliability of the composition flow.
• PathTime, which represents the safety time guarantee of the composition flow.
6. Boolean variables representing the elements of the legal issues are defined. These variables are
used in defining the Legal issues as Boolean statements.
7. A UPPAAL structure that represents the contextual information of the service requester is defined.
The structure contains dimensions and associated tag values.
4.1.1 Transformation Rules
The transformation rules are divided into two sets. The first set defines the rules to transform an indi-
vidual ConfiguredService into a TA. The second set defines the rules to transform the composition flow
into a TA. Each ConfiguredService can be mapped to a UPPAAL template in a one to one manner. A
ConfiguredService si = 〈Λi,αi,βi,σi〉 is mapped to a template tai = 〈Li,L0i,Ki,Ai,Ei, Ii〉. Following are
the transformation rules to generate tai for each si.
1. For each tai create two locations Li = {l1, l2}, and set the first location as the initial state L0i = {l1}.
2. Create two edges in Ei = {e1,e2} in tai, with edge e1 directed from l1 to l2 and edge e2 directed
from l2 to l1.
3. Define an action for each si and add it to Ai.
4. Add to edge e1 the following expressions:
(a) Add to guard the condition that all si preconditions are equal to true.
(b) Add to guard the condition that all si input parameters are available.
(c) Add to guard the condition that the si contextual rules are satisfied.
(d) Add to guard the condition that the si legal rules are satisfied.
(e) Add to Sync the channel variable corresponding to si request and follow it with ?.
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5. Add to edge e2 the following expressions:
(a) Add to update the statement that assign all si postconditions variables to true.
(b) Add to update the statement that assign all si output parameters variable to true.
(c) Add to Sync the channel variable corresponding to si responses and follow it with !.
The steps described above generates a TA for each ConfiguredService. The next step is to generate the
main TA that maps to the composition execution flow. Before generating this TA, the composition flow
should be flattened to contain only sequential composition construct. In essence, every composition
flow can be flattened into a set of sequential composition flows of ConfiguredServices [10].
Example 5 The composition (A .c1 B) (C||D) F◦c2 defined in Example 3 can be flattened into 8
composition flows, where Xc indicates that X is associated with condition c. These are: (1) Ac1C`D,
(2) Ac1C`D Fc2... Fc2, (3) Ac1 D`C, (4) Ac1 D`C Fc2... Fc2, (5) B¬c1C`D,
(6) B¬c1C`D Fc2... Fc2, (7) B¬c1 D`C, and (8) B¬c1 D`C Fc2... Fc2.
The main TA will contain an idle state. For each flattened composition flow, a path of states is created in
the main TA starting from this idle state according to the following rules.
1. For each ConfiguredService create two states. The first represents the request for the Configured-
Service and the second represents the completion of the execution.
2. For each ConfiguredService, if it contains a safety time constraint, create a new clock and add the
timing constraint as an invariant on the location. Exception: if the sequential construct resulted
from parallel flattening X`Y , only add the invariant to the state with the highest time constraint
of X and Y , and make the other state a committed state.
3. For each ConfiguredService create two edges. The first connects the state representing the previous
ConfiguredService in the flow, except for the first ConfiguredService where it connect idle state, to
the first state defined in rule 1. The second connects the first state to the second state of rule 1.
4. If the ConfiguredService is associated with a condition (conditional choice or iteration condition),
add this condition as a guard statement on the first edge of rule 3.
5. If the ConfiguredService has a safety data conditions, add this condition as a guard statement on
the first edge of rule 3.
6. If the ConfiguredService has a price, add to the second edge of rule 3 an update statement that adds
the price to the path price variable.
7. If the ConfiguredService has an availability nonfunctional property, add to the second edge of rule
3 an update statement that adds the availability to the path availability variable.
8. If the ConfiguredService has a reliability nonfunctional property, add to the second edge of rule
3 an update statement that adds the reliability to the path reliability variable. Exception: if the
sequential construct resulted from parallel flattening, the update statement is only added to the
edge with the highest reliability time.
A reasoned justification for the transformation steps is given in [10].
4.2 Verification
Using UPPAAL editor, the ConfiguredServices and their composition are specified as UPPAAL templates
following the automatic transformation rules defined in Section 4.1. UPPAAL verifier can be used to
verify the following properties.
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• Context: The context rules are not contradictory, and are met for each ConfiguredService.
• Functionality: The behavior of the composition is correct with respect to functionality, which
includes verifying.
– The preconditions of each participating ConfiguredService are met before invocation.
– The input parameters of each participating ConfiguredService are available before invocation.
– The composition generates the required postconditions and output parameters.
• Nonfunctional and trustworthiness properties: The behavior of the composition is correct with
respect to nonfunctional properties, which includes verifying.
– The composition price is greater than or equal the price of any possible execution flow.
– The composition safety time constraint is greater than or equal the time constraint of any
possible execution flow.
– The composition availability time is greater than or equal to the availability time of any
possible execution flow.
– The composition reliability time is greater than or equal to the reliability time of any possible
execution flow.
• Legal issues: The legal rules are not contradictory, and are met for each ConfiguredService.
Example 6 Applying the transformation rules defined above to the service composition RepairShop
TowTruck CarRental introduced in Example 1, the composition is transformed into 4 TA’s mapped
to 4 UPPAAL templates, a template for each ConfiguredService and a template for the composition
flow. The TA mapped to the ConfiguredService RepairShop is tars = 〈Lrs,L0rs,Krs,Ars,Ers, Irs〉, as seen
in Figure 5(a), where the tuple components are explained below
• The set of locations is Lrs = {idle,RepairShopProcessing} and the initial location is L0rs = idle.
• The set of clocks is krs =Φ and the set of invariants is Irs =Φ.
• The set of actions is Ars = {ScheduleApt,AptCon f irmed}.
• The set of edges is Ers = {(idle−RepairShopProcessing),(RepairShopProcessing− idle)}.
• The edge connecting ’idle’ to ’RepairShopProcessing’ has the following statements, where ’pa-
rameterB’ indicates the variable indicating the availability of the parameter ’parameter’:
– Guard: (RequesterContext.membership==1)&&(CarBroken==true)&&(car
Type==toyota)&&carTypeB&&failureTypeB.
– Synchronous: ScheduleApt?.
The edge connecting RepairShopProcessing to idle has the following statements:
– Update: HasAppoitment=true,NumOfDaysB=true,Deposit=Deposit +300.
– Synchronous: AptConfirmed!.
The TAs mapped to the ConfiguredServices TowTruck and CarRental are created in the same manner.
Figure 6 shows the generated main TA. UPPAAL is used to verify several properties listed below. The
notations M.i and M.Final_1 are used to denote the initial and final states of the TA M.
• The composition does not contain any contradiction and can be executed. If the UPPAAL statement
E<> M.Fi nal_1 is verified it implies that it is possible to reach the final state of the composition
flow. Reaching the final state indicates that all conditions are met and no contradictions exist.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: a) RepairShop TA, b) TowTruck TA, and c) CarRental TA
Figure 6: Example 6 Main TA
• The context rules are met. For each context rule an UPPAAL verification condition is generated
and verified. For example, A[] M.i imply RequesterContext.age>=21 is the condi-
tion to be verified to assert that the requester is older than 21. Here, RequesterContext is
the UPPAAL structure holding the contextual information of the service requester.
• The composition input parameters are defined before executing the composition flow. For example,
A[] M.i imply failureTypeB is the condition to be verified in order to assert that the car
failureType parameter is available before execution. Here, failureTypeB is a Boolean
variable representing the availability of the parameter failureType.
• The composition output parameters are defined after executing the composition flow. For exam-
ple, A[] M.i imply !NumOfDaysB is the condition to be verified in order to assert that the
number of days needed to fix the car are not known before executing the composition. The state-
ment A[] M.i imply !NumOfDaysB, if verified, asserts that the number of days is known
after executing the composition. The parameter NumOfDaysB is a Boolean variable representing
the availability of the parameter NumOfDays.
• The preconditions are met before executing the composition and the postconditions are met after.
For example, A[] M.i imply NeedCar==true will have to be verified to assert that the
precondition “NeedCar” is true at the initial state.
• The composition of nonfunctional properties are correct. For example, A[] M.Final_1 imply
firstPathPrice <= 600 will have to be verified to assert that the price of the composite
service is less than 600, where 600 is specified as the price of the service composition.
• The composition result of the legal rules are correct. For example, A[] M.Final_1 imply
400>=Deposit will have to be verified to assert that the deposit is less than 400, if the legal rule
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states that “The service requester should deposit 400 before requesting the service composition”.
5 Related Work
Many researchers, such as [7], [5], [9], [6] and [17], have investigated the formal models automata,
Petri-net and process algebra as service models and used a transformation approach to arrive at the for-
mal models from service descriptions in one of the languages BPEL [14], WS-CDL [22] or Orc [13].
However, these formal languages can model only the functional behavior of services. Hence, the trans-
formation approaches practiced so far are restricted to only the functionality in composite services, while
the nonfunctional, legal and contextual constraints are ignored. As a consequence, the known verifica-
tion processes cannot be applied to construct composite services in our model. The merit of our work is
twofold. One is the introduction of a variety of compositions which can be tailored to the semantics of
a business logic, and the other is the ability to combine functional and nonfunctional behavior together
with legal and contextual constraints in model checking.
6 Conclusion
Our research aims to define a formal framework for managing and providing service with context-
depended contracts. As part of this framework, in this paper we have presented an approach for the
formal specification and verification of services with context-dependent contract. We presented a for-
mal definition and a formal composition theory of ConfiguredServices. Finally, we presented a formal
transformation approach to transform service composition into extended timed automata that can be ver-
ified using UPPAAL tool. Currently, we are working on defining a dynamic composition approach that
automates the service composition process at execution-time. We are also investigating dynamic recon-
figuration issues arising out of defaults and dynamic compositions of services. Finally, we are currently
developing a set of tools that automate the composition and verification process.
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